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Notes towards aN aNalytics of resistaNce
Costas Douzinas
Abstract New forms, subjects and strategies of resistance have emerged in 
recent mass protests and insurrections, from the Arab Spring to Spain, Greece, 
Turkey and Brazil. Insurrections, exodus and democratic experimentation 
respond to the economic and social landscape of neoliberal capitalism and 
the biopolitical operation of power. Using historical and recent examples, 
this essay proposes seven theses on the philosophy of resistance. We have 
entered a new age of resistance and potentially radical change after fifty years 
of failures and defeats of the left.
Keywords resistance, Greece, Spain, Turkey, biopolitics, neoliberalism, left 
politics
On 17 June 2011 I was invited to address a thematic assembly on direct 
democracy at the Syntagma square occupation by the aganaktismenoi 
(indignados) in central Athens. After the talks and following usual procedure, 
members of the occupation who had had their number drawn came to the 
front to speak to the 10,000 crowd. One man in the queue was shaking and 
trembling with evident symptoms of stage fright before his address. He then 
proceeded to give an elegant talk in perfectly formed sentences and paragraphs, 
presenting a complete and persuasive plan for the future of the movement. 
‘How did you do it?’ I asked him later. ‘I thought you were going to collapse.’ 
‘This is what I feared too’, he replied nonchalantly. ‘When I started speaking 
I was mouthing the words but someone else was speaking. A stranger inside 
me was dictating what to say.’ Many participants in the recent protests and 
uprisings make similar statements. Sarah, an Egyptian, tells her mother after 
spending time in Tahrir Square: ‘I am not myself. I am somebody new that was 
born today’.1 A youth in the Athens December 2008 insurrection adds: ‘I had 
been in demos before but never participated in a riot. It was something like 
an initiation for me and I have to admit I felt liberated. It made me feel like 
a regained control of myself ’.2 This essay is a commentary on this ‘stranger in 
me’ (a usual description of the unconscious), a miraculous transubstantiation 
shared by people in different parts of the world, which has changed them from 
obedient subjects of law to resisting subjectivities. 
 The essay forms part of a wider project which, starting from recent events, 
attempts to develop a radical politics for the age of resistance.3 The first part 
discusses Alain Badiou’s reaction as a typical case of radical pessimism. The 
second examines briefly some of the common characteristics of globalised 
neoliberal capitalism. This rather sketchy account helps situate the final part, 
1. Paul Mason, Why 
it’s Kicking Everywhere 
Verso, London 2012, 
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2. Quoted in 
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2011, p155.
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which develops seven theses towards a philosophy of resistance. 
     
ON LEFT MELANCHOLY
The ‘new world order’ announced in 1989 was the shortest in history, coming 
to an abrupt end in 2011. Protests, riots and uprisings have erupted all over 
the world. Neither the mainstream nor the radicals had predicted the wave, 
and this led to a search for historical precedents. A former director of Britain’s 
Secret Intelligence Service thought that ‘it’s a revolutionary wave, like 1848’. 
The commentator Paul Mason agrees: ‘There are strong parallels   above all 
with 1848, and with the wave of discontent that preceded 1914’ (p14). On 
the left, the philosopher Alain Badiou suspects a possible ‘rebirth of history’ 
in a new age of ‘riots and uprisings’ that brings to an end a long interval 
after the last revolutionary upheaval. But the optimistic opening soon comes 
to an end.4 Against substantial evidence of a worldwide wave of uprisings, 
not unlike Badiou’s favourite instances of 1848 and 1968, the philosopher 
adopts the most pessimistic reading of Foucault’s theory claiming that 
resistance is generated and used by power. He dismisses social movements, 
anti-globalisation campaigns and radical parties, lamenting the ‘impotence’ 
of the left. History’s rebirth ends up a stillbirth.
 Many radical philosophers share Badiou’s pessimism. There is general 
agreement that recent events brought to a temporary end a long period of 
defeat and retreat of the left. This welcome development is accompanied 
however by a sense of embarrassment and disbelief in the emancipatory 
potential of resistance. It is as if the lull that followed the emptying of the 
squares came as a relief, allowing the theorists to return to well-known 
reservations about the crowd or the left more generally. Slavoj Žižek wrote 
in 2012 that 2011 was ‘the year of dreaming dangerously’. ‘Now, a year later’, 
he adds, ‘every day brings new evidence of how fragile and inconsistent that 
awakening [of radical emancipatory politics all around the world] was…’5 
Jacques Rancière’s theory, according to which politics is the emergence of 
the excluded part, the part that has ‘no part’, is perhaps closest to recent 
resistances. Rancière himself however admitted that ‘I have nothing in 
particular to say about Greece, or about the revolutionary strategy that 
should be adopted so that Greece triumphs and Europe goes on to become 
communist’.6 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, the theorists of multitude, 
conclude in their Declaration that ‘we need to empty the churches of the Left 
even more, and bar their doors, and burn them down!’7 From a different 
perspective, Howard Caygill’s excellent recent book On Resistance shares the 
pessimism. Its concluding sentences refer to contemporary rebellions without 
much hope: ‘Resistance is engaged in defiant delegitimization of existing and 
potential domination but without any prospect of a final outcome in the guise 
of a revolutionary or reformist result or solution … The politics of resistance 
is disillusioned and without end.’ 8 
4. Alain Badiou, The 
Rebirth of History: 
Times of Riots and 
Uprisings, Verso 
2012, p38.
5. Slavoz Zizek, The 
Year of Dreaming 
Dangerously Verso, 
2012), 127. Zizek 
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positive assessment 
of the prospects of a 
left victory after the 
Turkish uprising in 
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party. See ‘Trouble 
in Paradise’, Vol. 
35, No 14, London 
Review of Books, 18 
July 2013, pp11-12.
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 It is Alain Badiou who formulated the reservations about recent resistances 
most consistently. Badiou is the last representative of the French philosophical 
renaissance of the 1960s. His theory of the event has been particularly influential 
amongst young radicals, who have used it to analyse the recent uprisings. This 
is not the case, however, with the master himself. At a conference about the 
‘greek symptom’ in January 2013, this author shared a panel with Badiou. 
After my upbeat presentation of resistances in the Mediterranean, Badiou 
responded: ‘I certainly admire the eloquence of my friend and comrade Costas 
Douzinas, who has buttressed his avowed optimism with precise references to 
what he takes to be the political novelties of the people’s resistance in Greece, 
where he has even discerned the emergence of a new political subject.’ When 
I heard the next sentence I thought I had misunderstood: ‘while the courage 
and inventiveness of the resistance is a cause of enthusiasm, it is neither novel 
nor effective. The same things happened in May 68, in Tahrir Square and even 
“in the times of Spartacus or Thomas Munzer”’.9 
 Badiou returns to his analysis in a recent newspaper interview. The ‘left’ 
is part of a ‘structural imposture’ he claims. The left, an idea created in and 
by the state, has made an agreement with the oligarchy with whom it wants to 
alternate in power. It has abandoned its commitment to radical change and 
promotes the myth that parliamentary elections can be used for ‘revolutionary’ 
purposes. The interview was taken a few days before the crucial 2014 European 
elections, which the Greek Syriza party was hoping to win - as it did. The 
leftist interviewer tried to distinguish therefore between social democracy and 
the radical left. Badiou would have none of it. The radical left differs only in 
‘nuance and detail, a minimal further redistribution without any foundational 
changes in the dominant capitalist logic’. The present author is a ‘useful 
enemy’ because, despite his links with emancipatory movements, he offers a 
‘beautified and limited’ picture of the situation, and does not realise that we 
must begin from scratch, following the example of the 1840 revolutionaries 
in ‘ideology, political criticism, types of mass action, organization. We must 
rethink everything and experiment’.10 
 Over the years, the left has collected a long list of prophets, parties and 
groups promising the re-foundation of the one or the ‘correct’ communist 
organisation. In earlier interventions, Badiou explained that the ‘resistance’ 
(in ironic quotation marks) of the anti-globalisation movement was equally 
a creation of power. The movement is ‘a wild operator’ of globalisation and 
‘seeks to sketch out, for the imminent future, the forms of comfort to be 
enjoyed by our planet’s idle petite bourgeoisie’.11 He called the multitude 
a ‘dreamy hallucination’, which claims the right for our ‘planet’s idle … to 
enjoy without doing anything, while taking special care to avoid any form of 
discipline, whereas we know that discipline, in all fields, is the key to truths’. 
Finally, he dismissed the category of the ‘movement’ because it is ‘coupled 
to the logic of the state’. Politics should stay away or ‘subtract’ from the state, 
remain largely indifferent to economic issues, adopt the ‘idea of communism’ 
9. Alain Badiou, 
‘Our Contemporary 
Impotence’, 
Radical Philosophy, 
September-October 
2013, p43.
10. Alain Badiou 
interview with Maria 
Kakogianni, ‘On 
the occasion of the 
publication of The 
Greek Symptom’, 
27/4 2014, Avgi 
(in Greek, my 
translation) at: 
www.avgi.gr/
article/2414442/
alain-mpantiou-
me-tin-eukairia-
tis-kukloforias-tou-
tomou-«to-elliniko-
sumptoma».
11. Alain 
Badiou, ‘Beyond 
Formalisation’, An 
Interview conducted 
by Pater Hallward 
and Bruno Bosteels, 
Paris, 2 July 2002, 
in Bruno Bosteels, 
Badiou and Politics, 
Duke University 
Press, Durham 2011, 
pp318-350.
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and create a highly disciplined organisation, which acts towards the people 
in a directive manner. This is the type of organisation that recent resistances 
rejected and with good cause: both because of the history of the left and, 
more importantly, because the socio-economic changes of late capitalism 
have made the concept of a highly disciplined organisation not just obsolete 
but undesirable and counterproductive. 
 What causes this endless melancholia? It looks as if Hegel’s ‘owl of 
Minerva’ has not yet left its nest. Is this because we are not at ‘dusk’ yet? 
In other words, philosophers cannot respond to the political and social 
upheaval because the epoch of resistance is still too new for theory to catch 
up. Or, is this enduring melancholy the result of a certain theoretical and 
political sclerosis of theoretical radicals? Failure, defeat, persecution and the 
accompanying paranoia have marked the left. It is true that the left has lost 
a lot: a unified theory, the working class as political subject, the promised 
inexorable forward movement of history, planned economy as alternative to 
capitalism. The falling masonry of the Berlin wall hit western socialists more 
than old Stalinists, who relatively easily morphed into post-soviet oligarchs. 
 In psychoanalytical theory, mourning a love object is necessary and 
liberating, while melancholy is the result of a failed and incomplete period of 
grief. In mourning, the libido withdraws from the lost object and is displaced 
onto another. In melancholy, it withdraws into the ego. This withdrawal 
serves to ‘establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object’.12 
Walter Benjamin wrote of ‘left melancholy’, the attitude of the militant who 
is attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal - and to the failure 
of that ideal - than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present.13 
Benjamin called on the left to grasp the ‘time of the now’; whereas for the 
melancholic, history is the ‘empty time’ of repetition.14 Part of the left is 
narcissistically fixated on its lost object with no obvious desire to abandon 
it. Left melancholy leads inexorably to the ‘fetishism of small differences’ 
interminable conflicts, splits and vituperation amongst erstwhile comrades. 
Attacks on the closest ally, seen as a threatening double, are more vicious 
than those on the enemy. Left melancholy betrays the world for the sake of 
old certainties. 
 Radical philosophy has returned to a particular type of ‘grand narrative’, 
which combines an obsession with the explanation of life, the universe and 
everything with the ‘anxiety of influence’ created by the previous generation 
of greats   Sartre, Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida. There is much to learn 
from radical theory. However contemporary philosophers differ from their 
Marxist predecessors in two ways. First, in a reaction to the earlier economism 
and statism of the left, they steer clear of socio-economic analysis and, with a few 
exceptions, despise the state advocating, in Badiou’s term, a ‘subtraction’ from 
state politics. Secondly, they have little participation in left politics, preferring 
the lecture hall to the street and the party. There is nothing inherently wrong 
with grand theory, except when it paraphrases Brecht’s dictum that if the people 
12. Sigmund Freud, 
‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’, in Vol. 
14, The Standard 
Edition of the Complete 
Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Hogarth 
1957, p249.
13. Walter Benjamin, 
‘Left-Wing 
Melancholy’, in The 
Weimar Republic 
Sourcebook, ed. 
Anton Kaes, Martin 
Jay and Edward 
Dimendberg, 
University of 
California Press 
1994, p305. See 
Wendy Brown, 
‘Resisting Left 
Melancholy’, 
Boundary 2 26.3.99, 
pp19-27, for a 
brilliant use of the 
Benjamin essay.
14. Walter Benjamin, 
The Arcades Project, 
Harvard University 
Press 1999, pp462-3.
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have chosen wrongly we should elect another people: if the facts disprove 
the theory, so much the worse for the facts. Cases that cannot be seamlessly 
inserted into the theoretical edifice - Greece, Spain, the youth insurrections 
are downplayed or rejected. It is no surprise that many European radicals are 
happy to celebrate the late Chavez, Morales or Correa and to carry out politics 
by proxy, while dismissing the European left as irrelevant or misguided. 
 It may feel better to some people to lose gloriously than to win even 
with some compromise along the way. But repeated defeats do not help the 
millions whose lives have been devastated by neoliberal capitalism. What the 
left needs is not a new model party or an all-encompassing brilliant theory. 
It needs to learn from the popular resistances that broke out without leaders, 
parties or common ideology and to build on the energy, imagination and 
novel institutions created. The historical opportunity has been created not 
by party or theory but by ordinary people who are well ahead of both. 
THE AGE OF RESISTANCE
Alain Badiou rightly insists that politics is a type of thinking; its ‘truth’ emerges 
in political action. Philosophy takes this truth and universalises it. I plead 
guilty to the indictment of ‘avowed optimism’. It is a result of the attempt 
to draw lessons from the politics of the street of the last few years. We have 
entered an age of resistance. New forms, strategies and subjects of resistance 
and insurrection appear regularly without knowledge of or guidance from 
Badiou, Zizek or Negri. Their timing is unpredictable but their occurrence 
certain. As resistances spread around the world from austerity ravaged 
countries to Turkey and Brazil - the former poster boys of neoliberalism - 
to Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ukraine, philosophy has 
the responsibility to explore this contemporary return and to develop a 
philosophy of resistance. 
 In an interview towards the end of his life, Michel Foucault commented that 
‘politics has existed since the nineteenth century because of the revolution’. 
Now that revolution has disappeared, he continues, ‘there is a risk that politics 
will disappear’ unless one invents another form or substitute for it’. Against 
the models of the Greek sage, the Jewish prophet and the Roman legislator, 
Foucault imagines a type of intellectual who would pose the question ‘whether 
the revolution is worth the trouble, and if so which revolution and what 
trouble’.15 If the revolution ended, what is the politics after the revolution? 
 This essay examines recent forms of resistance, using examples from 
Greece, the most advanced and successful European case. It should be 
immediately added that Greece does not have a privileged entry in some 
celestial book of glorious nations or of resisting peoples. It was chosen by 
the European powers as a guinea pig to test the conditions for restructuring 
late capitalism in crisis. Greece has become an unprecedented in the 
West laboratory for austerity and the accompanying impoverishment and 
15. Quoted in 
Jessica Whyte, 
‘Michel Foucault 
on revolution, 
neoliberalism 
and rights’ in 
Ben Golder ed., 
Re-reading Foucault: 
On Law, Power and 
Rights, Glasshouse, 
Abington 2013, 
p208. Whyte and 
Golder have rescued 
Foucault’s radical 
theory of law and 
rights against 
persistent attempts 
to present the late 
Foucault as a liberal 
supporter of rights.
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degradation of life. What the European and Greek elites did not expect was 
that the guinea pig would occupy the lab, kick out the blind scientists and start 
a new experiment: its own transformation from object to political subject.16 
As a laboratory of resistance, Greece offers a panorama of what is happening 
elsewhere. Let us start with a brief description of novel or radically renewed 
methods of insubordination. 
Forms of resistance
1. On 6 December 2008, after the police murder of Alexis Grigoropoulos, a 16-
year old pupil in central Athens, a massive spontaneous leaderless insurrection 
by pupils, students and workers brought Greece to a standstill. Rallies and 
marches to Parliament, Ministries and police stations were accompanied 
by sit-ins, street happenings, interruption of theatre performances and 
discussions with the audience, the raising of a banner calling for resistance on 
the Acropolis, the occupation of a state TV studio during the news broadcast 
and the iconic burning of the Christmas tree in Syntagma Square. Banks and 
luxury shops were attacked, some looting was reported and several cars and 
some buildings were burned, but there were no casualties. The insurrection 
paved the way for the eventual resignation of the right-wing government and 
its defeat in November 2009, which gave a huge majority to Papandreou’s 
socialists and led to the ushering of the neoliberal austerity measures. The 
similarities with the Paris banlieues insurrection of 2005 and 2007 and the 
London August 2012 riots, which also started after the death of young people 
following police action, were striking. 
2. Athens, February 2011. While the Arab spring was in full flow, 300 sans 
papiers immigrants from the Maghreb took refuge in Hypatia, a central Athens 
building, and staged a hunger strike. They had lived and worked in Greece 
for up to ten years, doing the jobs the Greeks didn’t want to do for a fraction 
of the minimum wage, and without social security. When the crisis struck, they 
were unceremoniously kicked out. After forty days, with several strikers in 
hospital with irreversible organ failure that could cause death, the government 
accepted the bulk of their demands, and allowed them to stay in the country. 
A widespread solidarity campaign supported the sans papiers strikers. Their 
victory was seen as the first success of the anti-austerity resistance which was 
kicking off at the time of the strike. 
3. Athens, May 2011. Following a solidarity rally with the Spanish indignados, 
men and women of all ideologies, ages and occupations, including the many 
unemployed, calling themselves aganaktismenoi, occupied the Syntagma 
square in Athens opposite Parliament and sixty other squares. Political 
parties and banners were discouraged, no leaders or spokespersons emerged. 
Daily popular assemblies and thematic meetings discussed all aspects of the 
16. Costas Douzinas, 
Resistance and 
Philosophy in the 
Crisis: Politics, Ethics 
and Stasis Syntagma, 
Alexandria Press, 
Athens, December 
2011, back cover.
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political and economic situation and decided the next actions democratically. 
A number of working groups covered all major needs of the occupiers - food, 
health, security, media, entertainment, legal advice, etc. The occupations were 
peaceful but faced brutal police attacks. When the police finally removed 
the occupants in late July, the popular assemblies spread to suburbs and 
towns. In June, Prime Minister Papandreou, unable to deal with the protests, 
resigned, only changing his mind after party pressure. His fate was sealed 
however. He departed in early November soon after people occupied the 
street where a military parade was about to take place and the President of the 
Republic had to flee. In the 2012 general elections and the 2014 European 
elections, the multitude of resistances adopted the radical left party Syriza as 
its parliamentary representation. The journey of Syriza from a small protest 
party to government in waiting is a political fairy tale. The party polled 4 per 
cent in 2009, became the main opposition in 2012 and received 27 per cent 
of the vote in 2014, with the right-wing governing party down to 23 per cent. 
Syriza will now probably form the next government of Greece.
 The multiplication and intensification of resistances can be understood 
through an exploration of the state of affairs they respond to. Resistances 
respond to trends of globalised capitalism that have penetrated and shape 
the whole world. AS it will be argued resistance is always situated, it responds 
to a specific and historically located balance of forces. This is the reason 
why a brief exploration of the state we are in follows. It will move from the 
economic and social landscape late capitalism to its bio-political implications 
and, finally, the effects of these developments on the politics of law. 
THE LANDSCAPE OF LATE CAPITALISM 
Postfordist capitalism 
It was Marx who first introduced the concept of the general intellect and 
immaterial labour, the work and creation of the collective mind, science and 
technology. In post-industrial capitalism, immaterial production has become 
the major productive force. Industrial capitalism turned the concrete into 
abstract, the product into commodity. Post-fordism turns thoughts, ideas and 
words immediately into material objects and products. The general intellect 
is no longer incorporated in machines, but in the lives of working people. 
Three consequences follow.
 First, the nature of work has changed radically. Permanent work is on 
the way out. Work is increasingly part-time, flexible, temporary, and based 
on piecework: long periods of unemployment following short periods of 
work are now the rule. We must be flexible, adjustable, willing to learn and 
to continuously improve our skills, knowledge and aptitudes. In the past, a 
‘reserve army’ of unemployed was used to push wages down. Technology, 
automation and the transfer of industry to the newly industrialising countries 
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have made a large number of people superfluous. They are the unemployed 
and unemployable, young and old, immigrants and refugees, those called 
‘human debris’ or ‘no use humans’. 
 The second change is the extensive and violent privatisation of the 
remaining commons. The three commons of social life and culture, external 
nature and our own biological nature are being systematically sold off. We must 
rent back from capital our common substance and our collective achievement. 
Everything that can be sold will be sold and then hired back to us. 
 Finally, profit takes two new forms: rent for services and interest for capital. 
Late capitalism increasingly works through consumption funded by debt. 
People, companies and states must borrow to spend. Student loans and loans 
for personal consumption, enterprise loans and mortgages make most of us 
permanently indebted. Debt has become integral to life. It is not - as it is often 
presented - the great enemy: it is the necessary lubricant in the economy of 
services. Debt as a social relation and moral concept has additional benefits 
for capital.17 The debtor is infused with guilt and forbearance; the creditor 
controls her conduct much more than the employer does the employee. 
The debtor is formally free but only if she commits her life to the mission of 
repayment and (moral and financial) redemption. Debt ensures the obedient 
conduct of the debtor, closing off possibilities of resistance. In this sense, our 
current predicament is not a debt crisis, but capital’s desire of debt. 
Biopolitical capitalism 
These socio-economic changes are accompanied by a new arrangement of 
power. Biopolitics is the exercise of power on bios, life. It extends from the 
depths of consciousness to the bodies and souls of the population. Population 
control is supplemented by technologies of the self that discipline and 
control individual behaviour. Biopolitical capitalism does not only produce 
commodities for subjects: it also creates subjects. The last thirty years have 
given us a clear picture of the complementary processes of population and 
individual control. 
 Material, social, affective, ethical and cognitive strategies are involved 
in this process. During periods of economic growth, working people were 
inserted directly into the economy through private and public debt and 
consumption. The indebted worker accepts that freedom of consumer choice 
and personal responsibility are the main criteria of success. Proliferating 
individual rights support this socio-economic integration. Every desire 
could become an entitlement; every ‘I want X’ a ‘I have a right to X’. But 
this atomisation of the population is also the achilles heel of late capitalism. 
The worker can withdraw abruptly and even violently from participating in 
the escalating spiral of desire, satisfaction and frustration. If one of the links 
in the integration chain breaks, the overall psychological and ideological 
architecture collapses. This can happen through the sudden loss of a job, a 
17. Maurizio 
Lazzarato, The 
Making of the Indebted 
Man, Semiotext(e) 
2011.
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major deterioration in conditions of life or expectations, an attack on personal 
or national dignity, or frustration of desires or promises. It may erupt after 
an accumulation of humiliations, or in response to an event that condenses 
a plethora of grievances. 
 Southern Europe is a textbook case of debt’s desire. After entry to the 
euro, the modernising governments promoted consumption and hedonism 
as the main way of linking private interests with the common good. People 
were treated as desiring and consuming machines. Easy and cheap loans, 
bribes to get people to transfer their savings into stocks and shares, and 
an artificial increase in real estate values, became the main instruments of 
economic growth, as well as the criteria for individual happiness and social 
mobility. The ‘obscene’ father of psychoanalysis kept telling the Greeks 
borrow, ‘enjoy’, ‘buy’, live as if this is your last day. This consumer paradise 
of desire-satisfaction-frustration is pure nihilism. 
 Austerity violently reversed priorities in order to achieve the same objective 
of controlling populations through indebtedness and guilt. The banks bailout 
and the increasing cost of servicing an increasingly unemployed and aging 
population added a huge sovereign debt to personal indebtedness. The 
population is now divided according to age, occupation, gender and race, 
and radical behavioural change is imposed for the sake of ‘national salvation’. 
The politics of personal desire and pleasure is transformed and becomes a 
new strategy for saving the nation, through the abandonment of its individual 
members to the rigors of sin, guilt and punishment. This atomisation of 
the population was pursued first by the modernising policies of supposed 
freedom of choice and personal responsibility through debt and consumption. 
Punitive austerity completes the project by turning aggressive into defensive 
individualism, the contemporary culmination of nominalism: only individuals 
and the Sovereign exist, confronting each other in an almost permanent state 
of exception. The victims of austerity are asked to adjust their behaviour to 
the ‘needs’ of the nation and to be subjected to extensive controls, which aim 
at recovering social health. Austerity is an aggressive biopolitical correction. 
It covers every aspect of life from the basics like food, electricity and clothing 
to health, education, social security and leisure.18
 Austerity is providing the cover for a top-down re-arrangement of 
capitalism. Austerity has been used to reduce workers’ salaries, rights and 
benefits, while at the same time ensuring the continuing profitability of capital. 
The European elites had already decided on these reforms; the debt (public in 
the case of Greece, private in Spain and Ireland) offered a convenient pretext 
for their fast and brutal imposition and moralisation. The message is that 
people sinned in falling for the sirens of consumerism and must be punished. 
In the case of Greece, Angela Merkel acts like Freud’s cruel superego: the more 
you obey the more you get punished. ‘What does Angela Merkel want?’ ask 
the Greek elites. But the lady keeps changing her tune. On some occasions, 
she wants Greece expelled from the euro, on others she wants to keep the 
18. Athena 
Athanassiou, The 
Crisis as a ‘State of 
Exception’, Savalas, 
Athens 2012.
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country in the Eurozone. Most often she doesn’t tell. But, as psychoanalysis 
teaches us, the continuous questioning keeps desire going. The desperate 
attempt to divine the desires and please Angela Merkel, the ‘ego ideal’ of 
Greek elites, keeps piling new austerity on low-income and unemployed 
Greeks, the only people who had no part in the creation of public debt. 
Biopolitical law
The legal system of late capitalism has changed in two complementary ways: 
most areas of private activity are becoming legalised, while public services and 
utilities are being released from their re-distributive aims and given over to 
the disciplines of the market. Laws are no longer the democratic expression 
of sovereignty or the liberal formalisation of morality; they are the purely 
utilitarian instruments of governance, frameworks for organising private 
activities, reducing market uncertainties and lowering transaction costs. This 
is a sad remnant of the honourable tradition of the rule of law. The law is 
expanding but at the price of assuming the characteristics of contemporary 
society, becoming open, decentred, fragmented and nebulous. 
 The dynamic of modern law - and of the metaphysics of modernity - was 
to open a distance, occasionally minimal, between law and the order of the 
world, the ought as correction of the is. Law was one form of the ideal, next 
to the other great normative horizons, religion, nation, socialism. Now, 
however, law’s distance from the social order is fast disappearing in the vast 
expanse of law-life. In Borges’s story of the cartographers of empire, the 
mythical cartographers asked to produce the most accurate possible map, 
ended with one the same size as the territory it mapped. Similarly, the law 
is well on the way to replicating life in its annals. This is a law with force but 
without normative weight, beyond the ideological preferences of ruling elites 
masquerading as scientific policies. 
 The dynamics of biopolitical governance determine legal strategies. 
In periods of economic growth, the detailed and suffocating regulation of 
life is accompanied by an apotheosis of individual desire expressed in the 
proliferation of rights. When the priorities are reversed, the superficial 
freedom of the previous period becomes counter-productive. Police repression, 
extensive surveillance and the criminalisation of resistance accompany an 
intensive effort to re-channel conduct. The repressive laws of the war of 
terror that are now used against political dissent and the invasive regulation 
of biopolitics do not contradict, but rather accompany and complement, 
rights. Freedom and security, instead of being opposed, are the two sides of 
biopolitical neoliberalism. 19 
A PHILOSOPHY OF RESISTANCE
How can we generalise these new forms of resistance? When does resistance 
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arise, how does it work, can it ever succeed? Michel Foucault started the 
analytics of power. Francoise Proust, following Foucault’s seminal work, 
continued with an analytics of resistance.20 This essay follows and seeks 
to update Proust’s project. We will proceed gradually, offering seven 
theses, building on the work of Foucault and Proust and relating them to 
contemporary instances of disobedience, insubordination and resistance.
Thesis 1. Resistance is a physical law of being, affecting every relationship
Resistance is physical: every force affected by another provokes a resistance, 
which thwarts the first without stopping it. Wherever there is power, in an 
intimate relationship or collectivity, in a university, company, political party 
or state, there is resistance. ‘This would be the transcendental of every 
resistance, whatever kind it be: resistance to power, to the state of things, 
to history; resistance to destruction, to death, to war; resistance to stupidity, 
to peace, to bare life’ (Proust, pp1-2). The resisting force accompanies the 
force it resists, but also confronts, destabilises and redirects it. Resistance is 
therefore inescapable, immanent to every relation. From the moment being 
takes form and figure or a balance of forces stabilises itself, it encounters 
resistances, which irreversibly turn, twist and fissure it. As the mirror of power, 
resistance is a relationship, a series of interactions amongst people and things. 
It keeps changing the balance of forces, and disturbing power asymmetries, 
continuously redefining and amending the position of the participants. 
 Resistance is therefore the condition of existence of every power 
relationship and not a transcendent force or violence that befalls its site 
of intervention from outside. From the moment power appears, resistance 
accompanies it and marks the beginning of a new and specific history. It is 
in this sense that Gilles Deleuze, commenting on Foucault, writes ‘the final 
word on power is that resistance comes first’.21
Thesis 2. Resistances are situated, local, concrete and multiform
Resistance emerges in a concrete situation and reacts against a unique 
balance of forces. Resistance is local, arising on a specific site and a singular 
conjuncture. It is therefore difficult to develop universal principles of 
resistance, even though common trends in different sites of power may lead 
to similar reactions. Every situation and age creates new forms, strategies 
and subjects. Resistance reacts to the concrete circumstances it finds itself 
in; it breaks down the basic constituents of the power constellation, analyses 
them, and puts them together again in a different new edifice that opposes or 
reroutes the earlier combination. This process feeds into power too. The new 
dissident configurations may be taken on by the counter-resisting dominant 
force and transfer from resistant to ruling positions. 
 This parochial operation is evident in most cases of political resistance. 
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In early modernity, the breaking of machines and sabotage by Luddites and 
Diggers, amongst others, responded to the capitalist destruction of traditional 
skills and crafts. Today the huge movement of populations in and across 
continents leads to demands for free travel and a guaranteed minimum 
income. Excessive indebtedness of individuals, companies and states leads 
to repayment strikes and calls for debt haircuts. The same dependence on 
the operations of power is evident in the recent cases of resistance. The new 
forms of resistance emerge within and against the circuits of power, reacting 
and rearranging its operations. As we will argue below, they react to postfordist 
capitalism, the operation of power on life, the decay of parliamentary 
democracy and the effects of these developments on law. This is the reason 
that a presentation of the state we are in must necessarily precede any attempt 
to understand the specificities of forms of resistance. 
Thesis 3. Resistance is a mixture of reaction and action, negation and affirmation
Resistance is local and situated; it responds to a situation or reacts to an event. 
Reaction may turn into action, reply, retort, renewal. Reactive resistance 
conserves or restores a state of things power has disturbed. Active resistance 
deconstructs the adversary’s arms, and borrows, mimics or subverts their 
components. Using the enemy’s rules, it invents new rules and institutions, 
and occupies the space reactive resistance has cleared. When power promotes 
privatisation of public assets, resistance deconstructs the private/public 
dichotomy and promotes new forms of property, such as the commons. 
When power creates unemployment, resistance constructs new cooperative, 
self-ruling forms of work and social activity.
  Let us move to the current forms and strategies of resistance, and the 
ways in which they re-direct the balance of forces. The emerging forms react 
to the dominant modes of capitalist subjection. We look first at the resistance 
of the expendable human or homo sacer; secondly, that of the biopolitically 
excluded; finally, that of the democratically disenfranchised.  
 The resistance of the contemporary homines sacri takes the form of exodus 
or martyrdom. Suicide, self-mutilation, hunger strikes, boarding the floating 
coffins that daily sink in the Mediterranean - all these are characteristic 
responses of those treated as expendable, redundant, economically useless. 
The Arab spring started with the self-immolation of Muhammad Boazizzi 
in Tunisia. The Athens hunger strikers, on the other hand, are the only 
immigrants who, against legal orthodoxy, have achieved through their 
collective action a political resolution of their abject condition. In a biopolitical 
world, life exists as registered life; undocumented life without birth certificates 
and IDs, visas and work permits is not recognised. Minimum humanity is 
created through what the immigrants lacked: papiers, documents, files. To 
retrieve their life from this administrative void, they had to come to the 
threshold of death. The migrants reversed the plot of Hegel’s master and 
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slave dialectic: by resisting their dehumanisation they became human and free. 
In this sense, the sans papiers became martyrs, both witnesses and sacrificial 
victims. They confirmed something that Rousseau as much as Freud and 
Sartre knew: humankind is free to die of freedom, but only collective political 
action can lead to emancipation. 
 The uprisings of pupils, students and marginalised youth in Paris 2005, 
Athens 2008 and London 2012 reacted to the biopolitical combination of the 
injunction to consumer satisfaction and police repression. Here the form is 
the spontaneous insurrection and riot, which often involves violence against 
property and looting. It arises after a violent event such as the killing of 
Alexis Grigoropoulos or Mark Duggan, or after a long series of humiliations 
that exhausts moral patience, as in the case of Boazzizi’s self-immolation. In 
Greece, no party planned or led the insurrections, no specific demands were put 
forward, no single ideology dominated. Politicians and commentators dismissed 
them as non-political criminality and blind violence. Alain Badiou, copying 
inadvertently Greek Premier Karamanlis in 2008 and British Cameron in 2012, 
wrote that the subject of riots is not political: it is ‘composed solely of rebellion, 
and dominated by negation and destruction, it does not make it possible clearly 
to distinguish between what pertains to a partially universalizable intention 
and what remains confined to a rage with no purpose’.22 But this is only partly 
true. The insurgents were people who exist socially but not politically. As their 
interests are rarely heard, accounted or represented, they must perform their 
existence, through the absolute negation of what exists. They did not demand 
anything specific, instead using Roman Jacobson’s ‘phatic expression’: they 
simply said ‘enough is enough, ‘here we stand against’. Not we claim this or 
that right, but we proclaim the ‘right to have rights’, the right to resistance.23 
This is politics at degree zero, a first but inadequate political baptism in the 
emergence of political subjectivity. Caught between the demands of insatiable 
desire and brutal repression, they performed the absolute freedom of acting 
out. When negation and affirmation, reaction and action, cannot be synthesised, 
they remain opposed, with violence the link. 
 Finally, the democratically disenfranchised have carried out democratic 
experimentation in occupations and encampments as well as in other forms 
of direct democracy. Citizens have been disenfranchised by the decay of 
parliamentary democracy and the disappearance of serious alternatives, 
in the rush of right-wing and social-democratic parties to the mythical 
centre. The principle of popular sovereignty that forms the foundation 
of many constitutions has turned into a legitimation myth, as democratic 
government increasingly mutates into technocratic governance. Occupations 
and encampments reject corrupt politics and post-democratic governance, 
abandon representation and the mandating of parliamentary politics, 
and experiment with new arrangements of political space and time. The 
localisation in a square creates a new fluid and open spacing of political power, 
while the intensity of bodily and emotional proximity, created by a common 
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political desire, acquires the characteristics of an emergent constituent power. 
The Syntagma multitude was the material coming together of people in 
public with a common political desire: radical political change. The demos 
returned to its original meaning as the plethos (the multitude) in assembly. 
 The first Syntagma resolution pronounced that ‘We are not leaving the 
squares before government, troika, banks, memoranda and those who exploit 
us have left’. This ‘we’ contrasted to the ‘they’ of the combined elites, and 
acted as a constitutional performative. It spoke for the whole population, 
which had rejected austerity but been betrayed by mainstream politicians. 
The productive energy of the multitude became temporarily a constituent 
assembly. It both mimicked and subverted the principle of representation 
and state organisation. Direct democracy characterised all aspects of the 
occupation. An elaborate network of working groups offered a microcosm of 
the services of a democratic state operating under a strict axiom of equality. 
The Syntagma occupiers were not the suffering and victimised population 
of media coverage. They were a resisting and active people, who put into 
practice direct democracy and prefigured the necessary institutional reforms 
of a democracy to come. 
Thesis 4. Resistance changes subjectivities and constructs new identities 
Individual and collective subjectivities emerge in the interstices of relations 
of power. Subjects are always subjected, subjugated to the dominant forces, 
before they become free.24 Resistances unpick and redirect the subject. At the 
individual level, revolt lies at the foundation of self. For Freud, happiness exists 
at the price of revolt. There is no pleasure without obstacles, prohibitions and 
interdictions, without law, injunctions and sanctions. The pleasure principle 
calls on the self to conform, to obey the law, to fit in the social order. But 
this accommodation to the world is accompanied, like day by night, by the 
transgression of prohibitions, the Oedipal revolt against the principle of power 
symbolised by father, sovereign and law. The autonomy of the individual 
emerges at the price of revolt. Legal and social prohibitions and injunctions 
open the route of revolt, allowing the self to reach autonomous maturity. 
Revolt forms an integral part of the pleasure principle. But it is also part of 
the darker timeless drive beyond the pleasure principle. The return of the 
repressed trauma forms part of the repertory of resistance. 
 Individual and collective dissident identities emerge out of acts of 
resistance. The tension between, on the one hand, symbolic differentiations 
and hierarchies, and, on the other, imaginary idealisations disarticulates the 
psychic sense of normality. We become new subjects; the ‘stranger in me’ 
emerges because my existence has misfired. When an unemployed youth 
realises that his condition is a symptom of the disease of the socio-economic 
system and not his own failure; when a sans papiers immigrant realises that her 
predicament is the symptom of a political and juridical system that divides 
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and excludes; when a lesbian realises that the suppression of her sexuality is 
a symptom of a system of disciplining and controlling bodies; at that point, 
subjects of resistance emerge. The negation following the failure of routine 
identities opens the road to the universality of resistance. It involves risk and 
perseverance: resistance is the courage of freedom. 
 This means, however, that one cannot become a subject of resistance 
simply through education or ideological training. Love and revolution come 
unannounced, like a miracle or an earthquake. One is hit on the head, like 
the blow of a coup de foudre; after that nothing remains the same. Joining the 
uprising or the occupation, irrespective of ideological commitment, is more 
important than ideological pedagogy or indoctrination. A Turkish protester 
told me that the first time she found herself, with her little daughter, in Gezi 
Park during a riot police attack with tear gas, she was paralysed with fear. 
Then people pulled both mother and child back and gave them water and 
protective masks. Her first reaction was to push them away, unused as she 
was to the caring touch of strangers. But once she realised that people were 
trying to help and felt the force of solidarity, the fear left her; she came back 
to the occupation every evening. 
 If - following Louis Althusser - ideology ‘interpellates’ the obedient subject, 
in the political baptism of resistance subjectivity is ‘interpellated’ by the event. 
The call does not come from Althusser’s proverbial policeman, but from what 
one may call the ‘normativity of the real’.25 Resisting subjectivity emerges when 
this initial call of refusal perseveres in the care of self with others. It is about 
behaviour not language, bodies not ideas, courage not theorising. As Foucault 
puts it, ‘there is after all no first or final point of resistance to political power 
other than in the relationship one has to oneself ’.26 Resisting subjectivity results 
from the change of one’s relationship to oneself, from the pleasure principle 
to the death drive. ‘I resist therefore I am’, as Daniel Bensaid put it.27
 Turning to our earlier examples, three forms of dissident subjectivity 
have emerged. First there is the martyr, someone who in order to exit 
dehumanisation and redeem existence, risks her life. Second is the rebel, 
for whom the uprising breaks the short circuit between insatiable desire and 
state violence and becomes a political baptism. Finally there is the direct 
democrat, who takes over parts of her life and turns democracy from a system 
of representative government into a form of life. 
Thesis 5. Resistance is a fact not an obligation, an is not an ought
Resistance does not simply apply values and principles, and does not have 
a predictable point of condensation and explosion. We don’t just resist in 
the name of something. It is not the idea of communism or the theory of 
justice that makes us take to the streets. Resistance is the bodily reaction to 
an overwhelming sense of injustice, an almost irrepressible response to hurt, 
hunger and despair. Resistance may involve a vision of justice, but this is not 
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necessary, certainly not at the beginning. 
 Ideas are not the cause but the result of resistance. The extent to which 
ideas of justice, equality or communism are maintained or lost depends 
on the existence and extent of resistance. Principles and values emerge in 
specific contexts as part of a resisting response to a particular configuration 
of power, and only later claim universal validity. For Nietzsche, morality is 
the absolutisation of a temporary balance of forces. In classical Greece, the 
logos was initially a philosophical weapon against the claims of elders and 
priests to power and authority. Christ’s teachings started as part of the Jewish 
resistance against the Roman empire. Early Christianity was a small and 
persecuted sect before it became a global religion assuming the character 
of empire. Human rights started as the legal claims of Europeans excluded 
from political rule before they became universal principles of legality and 
morality. Today, paradoxically, they are both the ideology of late capitalist 
empire and the cry of the dissident. All normative claims start life as particular 
strategies of resisting a local configuration of power in a particular place and 
time. Parochial provenance and local encumbrance are entombed in their 
foundations and carry the seeds of their dissolution. 
 Universal values and their expression in rights do not exist in some 
ethereal normative space of law books and international treaties. It is only 
when people resist power and defend themselves that a real conception of 
right comes to existence. It is not the existence of rights and law that makes 
people stand up. It is when people have stood up to defend their dignity - and 
when they still do - that rights have been created and power minimally respects 
them. For the ordinary person, disobedience is the deeply moral decision to 
break the law. It is a ‘dangerous freedom’. In normal circumstances, morality 
and legality represent two different types of overlapping but not identical duty: 
the external duty to obey the law (in formal terms a heteronomous duty) and 
the internal moral responsibility that binds the self to a conception of the good 
(autonomy). Conflicts are usually solved in favour of law. In disobedience, 
the duties collide and morality takes over.28 
 If resisting behaviour is not necessarily or automatically linked with moral 
principles, how can we distinguish between protests that appear intuitively 
radical and the attacks by wealthy elites against the egalitarian policies of 
Allende, Chavez or Morales? Can we act morally without and indeed against 
legal and moral norms which ban disobedience? Simon Critchley has argued 
that the disobedient subject commits itself ethically in terms of a demand that 
is received from a situation, for example a situation of political oppression 
or injustice. The ‘demand’ arises in specific circumstances (the killing of a 
young man in Paris, Athens or London, the self-immolation of another in 
Tunisia, the destruction of a park in Istanbul, the increase in bus fares in Rio 
de Janeiro), but is addressed in principle to everyone and anyone. The moral 
force of moral and legal norms derives from their universal form, which allows 
application in myriad future instances. The moral demand, on the contrary, 
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acquires force from the content of a situation, which acquires universal form. 
The moral demand’s universality makes it formally equivalent to the law but, 
unlike law, this is a ‘situated universality’. It emanates from a unique instance 
or event that requires a response engaging potentially everyone (the rejection 
of police brutality, the claim to equality or to the common good). Those who 
remain true to the demand become disobedient and moral subjects. The 
event, its demand (the concrete situation) and the moral subject therefore 
emerge together. It is not previous edification in the good or understanding 
of radical theory that makes the subject, but the answer to a unique event 
and its moral ‘call’. 
Thesis 6. Resistance and its subject emerge through the exercise of the right to resist 
While resistance is a fact not an obligation, the right to resist is the oldest, 
indeed the only natural, right. A legal right is justified and enforceable 
will. Whether private or public, the right to property or to vote, it appears 
as one, individual, undivided. It claims a single source, the subject’s will, a 
single justification, law’s recognition, a single effect, the will’s ability to act 
and shape the world. The modelling of political rights on property, however, 
contaminated their operation. As Hegel realised and Marx emphasised, a 
yawning gap separates the normative weight from empirical operation.29 
Formal right, the legal subject’s capacity to will, is theoretically limitless. 
But real people are embedded and embodied in the world of particularity. 
Property and normalised propriety act as quasi-transcendental preconditions, 
bridging the divide between formal right (the universal recognition of will) 
and its effective realisation in the world. We are all legally free and nominally 
equal, unless of course we are improper men, in other words men of no 
property, women, colonials, of the wrong colour, religion or sexuality. 
 At that point, will, the source of right, splits into two between that 
accepted and justified by law and a second, adopted by the dominated and 
the oppressed, for whom right is not about law and judges, a game they can 
scarcely play. It happens when people act against a system that, while claiming 
to represent the common good, has become an alien essence; or when an 
inner rebellion reacts to the widening chasm between universal vocation and 
particular belonging and prepares the resisting subjectivity. The split in will 
and right is replicated in the resisting subject, who sees their inner rebellion 
not as a personal inadequacy or failure but as the symptom of the disease of 
the social order and its law. Right now becomes a battle-cry, the subjective 
factor in a struggle, which asks to be raised to the level of the universal. It is 
the claim of the dissident against the abuses of power or the revolutionary 
against the existing order. 
 Right has therefore two metaphysical sources. As a claim accepted or seeking 
admission to the law, right is a publicly recognised will, which finds itself at peace 
with the world, a world made in its image and for its service. But secondly, right 
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is a will that wills what does not exist, a will that finds its force in itself and its 
effect in a world not yet determined all the way to the end. This second right 
is founded contra fatum, in the perspective of an open cosmos that cannot be 
fully determined by (financial, political or military) might:
All the forms of freedom that are acquired or demanded, all the rights 
that are claimed, even concerning the things that seem to be of least 
importance, probably have a lost point of anchor here … [in a man who 
prefers the risk of death over the certainty of having to obey] … more 
solid and experiential than ‘natural rights’.30  
This drive to resist eventually confronts domination and oppression, including 
those instituted and tolerated by the first legalised will. These two conceptions 
of right, or of the universal, manifest the confrontation of the death drive 
against desire and the pleasure principle. On one side, an acceptance of the 
order of things, raised to the dignity of general will, dresses the dominant 
particular with the mantle of the universal. The second universality is founded 
on a will created by a diagonal division of the social world separating rulers 
from the ruled and the excluded. It forms an agonistic universality emerging 
from the struggle of the excluded from social distribution and political 
representation. The excluded and disenfranchised are the only universal 
today in a legal and social system that proclaims incessantly its egalitarian 
credentials. 
Thesis 7. Collective resistance becomes political and may succeed in radically changing 
the balance of forces when it condenses different causes, a multiplicity of struggles 
and local and regional complaints, bringing them together into a common place and 
concurrent time
Resistance to power exists everywhere and keeps transforming relations of 
power and subjectivities. Uprisings go beyond their local situated, regional 
operation and limited effectiveness, however, when they are compressed 
in their demands and concentrated in their appearance. Take the Taksim 
square occupation. It started with a few ecologists defending Gezi, the last 
green space in central Istanbul, from bulldozers and cement. They were 
soon joined by many other people and groups - secularists protesting 
the government’s religious turn, Alevis rejecting the naming of the third 
Bosporus bridge, abandoned lovers, leftists attacking the neoliberal turn, 
republican supporters of the state, Europeanist modernisers, single mothers, 
Islamists rejecting state diktat, feminists protesting macho culture, shop 
assistants sacked for no good reason, gays and lesbians who want to kiss in 
public, young people who grew up with their parents in prisons, pickpockets, 
Kurds protesting the state’s attacks on language and culture, street kids, 
football fans, artists, low-paid families, sex workers, the unemployed, those 
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who came to the square for fun, finally those who cannot be included in 
any of these categories. They came from different social classes and income 
groups, various political ideologies and none, some with the most general of 
grievances others with specific, idiosyncratic complaints. They represented 
every section of the population; initially they had little in common, except 
for finding themselves together in the same place at the same time. Being 
together in a square and a park, sharing food, music and words, they were 
transformed from a motley crowd with many, sometimes antagonistic, 
demands into a multitude in the strictest sense of the term: a crowd with 
a common political desire in assembly. The squares are places of clearing 
and gathering, where popular will appears, sharing speech and action in 
a physical not metaphorical public sphere. The empty squares are our 
monument and the promise of a democracy to come. 
 When the Besiktas football club fans chanted ‘Erdogan you are the son 
of a whore’, women asked them to stop because several sex workers were 
in the square. The fans held a meeting and agreed to stop the chant. The 
following day a large banner appeared: ‘We, the whores: Erdogan is not our 
son’. It was the magical moment at which different energies, ideologies and 
complaints turned into one common demand: ‘Erdogan Go’. At such points, 
the solidarity of the governed rises from the particularity of the struggles 
towards a new right that emerges in practice and brings people together into 
a resisting multitude. Individual disobedience and isolated acts of defiance 
converge and become collective resistance. 
 Michel Foucault, commenting on the Iranian revolution, stated that:
… it is a fact that people rise up, and it is through this that a subjectivity 
(not that of great men, but that of everyone) introduces itself into history 
and gives it its life … It is precisely because there are such [uprisings] 
that human time does not take the form of evolution, but that of ‘history’ 
(ibid, p266). 
As long as the protesters ask for this or that reform, this or that concession, 
the state can accommodate them. What the state fears is the fundamental 
challenge to its power by a force that can transform the relations of law and 
present itself as having a ‘right to law’. In such cases, politics becomes the 
‘prescription of a possibility in rupture with what exists’ (Badiou, Metapolitics, 
p24). After a long period when markets and pliant governments claimed that 
smooth uninterrupted evolution was the future of humanity, we have entered 
again a time of history and of political subjectivity of everyone and anyone. 
 The role of intellectuals, as of all citizens, is to support politically and 
morally the uprisings that pass the test of situated morality. In What is Critique 
Foucault suggested that critique is l’art de n’être pas tellement gouverné.31 
He associated critique with resistance to governance and with acts of 
desubjectification. This is how he put it in a late seminar: 
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The role of the one who speaks [the intellectual in our context] is not 
that of legislator or the philosopher between camps, the figure of peace 
and armistice … To establish oneself between adversaries at the centre 
and above them, to impose a general law on each and to found an order 
that reconciles: this is not what is at issue. At issue is the positing of a 
right marked by dissymetry, the founding of a truth linked to a relation 
of force, a weapon truth and a singular right. The subject that speaks is 
a warring - I won’t even say a polemical - subject.32 
Similarly, for Edward Said the intellectual is a present-day Robin Hood 
who gives voice to those who would not be heard otherwise.33 This type 
of intellectual has jettisoned the responsibility of expertise or power for 
the irresponsibility of struggle. In English or French, ‘responsibility’ is 
etymologically linked with ‘response’. You are responsible when you respond 
to a (moral) demand. The demand may come from power or from the other. 
When responsibility is defined as consent to the commands of power it is 
not moral; in such cases, the moral attitude is irresponsibility. In periods 
of intense crisis the pressing need to take sides comes to the surface and 
trumps neutrality. The claim to objectivity, always a little problematic, can no 
longer be sustained, and becomes itself a site of confrontation. As the world 
is moving towards a state of permanent crisis and resistance, the engaged 
intellectual is returning.
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